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OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
The Prices are chapter 7 debtors
who wanted to use their automobiles while
remaining current on their monthly auto
loan payments.  The lienholder, Delaware
State Police Federal Credit Union (“Credit
Union”), convinced the Bankruptcy Court
and the District Court that section
521(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code does
not permit the Prices to continue
possessing the cars simply by paying their
2bills, but instead allows the Prices only
four options: surrender the cars, purchase
them in a lump-sum payment, negotiate
another loan that would attach post-
petition liability, or claim a recognized
exemption under the Bankruptcy Code.
This issue has been the subject of no fewer
than eight discordant decisions of the
courts of appeals.  Four courts of appeals
have held that a debtor is not limited by
the options enumerated in 521(2), while
four others have held to the contrary.  It
seems that the only thing our courts can
agree on is that we disagree.  After a close
examination of the text and context of
section 521(2)(A), we conclude that the
provision does not prevent nondefaulting
debtors, such as the Prices, from retaining
secured property by keeping current on
their loans.
I.
Michael and Christine Price filed a
petition for relief under chapter 7 on
December 11, 2001.  On their bankruptcy
schedules, the Prices listed two loans owed
to the Credit Union, which were secured
by liens on their two motor vehicles.
Along with their petition, the Prices filed
a “Statement of Intention with Respect to
Secured Debt,” indicating that they
intended to continue regular payments to
the Credit Union on the two secured loans
and retain the two vehicles.
Thereafter, the Credit Union
advised the Prices that their only choice in
connection with the retention of the cars
was to exercise one of the options stated in
section 521(2), namely:  (1) surrender the
vehicles; or, (2) if they wished to retain the
vehicles, redeem the collateral by making
a lump sum payment; or (3) enter into a
formal reaffirmation agreement.  The
Prices relied on their Statement of
Intention and took no further action other
than keeping up the payments on the loans.
At the time of filing of their petition, the
Prices were current on their payments on
the vehicle loans and they continued to
keep the loans current during the chapter 7
proceeding.  On February 21, 2002, the
Credit Union filed a Motion to Compel
Debtors to Elect to Surrender, Redeem, or
Reaffirm Secured Debt.
On June 25, 2002, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware granted the Credit Union’s
motion, and on April 1, 2003, the United
States District Court for the District of
Delaware affirmed the order of the
Bankruptcy Court.  Therefore, the Prices
are currently under order to surrender,
reaffirm, or redeem their automobiles,
although the effect of that order was stayed
by the District Court pending this appeal.
II.
At the outset, we will examine the
justiciability of this controversy in light of
recent communications received from the
parties regarding the effect of loan
payments made by the Prices.  We are
persuaded that this matter is not moot. 
On March 31, 2004, counsel for the
3Prices notified the panel that she believed
the Prices had paid the amount due to the
Credit Union under both auto loans and
that the matter may be moot.  However,
counsel urged us to decide the issue before
us, as it fell under the exception to the
mootness doctrine for issues “capable of
repetition yet evading review.”  In re
Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2003).
The panel sought the Credit Union’s
response, and it too “beg[ged] for
resolution by this Court” because “the
factual predicate central to this appeal
frequently recur[s] in the bankruptcy
courts in this circuit . . . .”  We note that
although both parties urge us to decide the
issue before us, parties may not stipulate as
to whether a matter is moot.  Kremens v.
Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 134 n.15 (1977).
This Court is duty-bound to independently
examine the issue of mootness.  North
Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246
(1971).  
Both parties make the argument that
this case qualifies under the exception to
the mootness doctrine for those cases that
are capable of repetition and yet which
evade review.  “Under the ‘capable of
repetition’ exception, a court may exercise
its jurisdiction and consider the merits of a
case that would otherwise be deemed moot
when ‘(1) the challenged action is, in its
duration, too short to be fully litigated
prior to cessation or expiration, and (2)
there is a reasonable expectation that the
same complaining party will be subject to
the same action again.’”  Merle v. United
States, 351 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17
(1998)).   It is reasonable to suppose that
the Credit Union will again encounter the
same scenario with respect to section
521(2) with other borrowers of auto loans.
And owing to the typically short duration
of these loans, the issue raised in this
appeal would arguably evade judicial
review.1  That this matter has been
    1The dissent appears to question
whether the Credit Union is not the same
“complaining party” that may confront a
similar legal quandary in the future.
However, it was the Credit Union that
moved the bankruptcy court to compel the
Prices to either redeem, reaffirm, or
surrender their automobiles.  The Credit
Union successfully defended that ruling in
the District Court and has continued to
make that case to our Court.  Thus, the
Credit Union is undoubtedly the
complaining party in the action before us.
Further, the dissent contends that it is
somehow “too speculative” to believe that
the Credit Union will again face a
borrower seeking chapter 7 protection.
But the inquiry, as the dissent
acknowledges, is whether there is a
“reasonable expectation” that the same
controversy will recur; we need not be
absolutely certain of the future.  As the
Supreme Court has noted, “in numerous
cases . . . we have found controversies
capable of repetition based on expectations
that, while reasonable, were hardly
demonstrably probable.”  Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305, 319 n.6 (1988); see also
Reich v. Local 30, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
6 F.3d 978, 985 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993).  We
4considered by several of our sister courts
of appeals does not gainsay this point.
Indeed, given the high volume of personal
bankruptcies in this judicial circuit, and the
twenty years of bankruptcy practice since
the enactment of section 521(2), it is
notable that this most basic issue of a
debtor’s obligation under chapter 7 is a
matter of first impression in this Court.
But in any event, even if this exception to
the mootness doctrine is inapplicable, we
cannot conclude on the record before us
that this matter is moot.
We doubt that the letters from
counsel, containing vague assertions as to
the satisfaction of the Prices’ loans, meet
the heavy burden of establishing mootness.
Princeton Cmty. Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate,
582 F.2d 706, 710 (3d Cir. 1978) (“party
arguing that a case is moot must bear a
heavy burden of demonstrating the facts
underlying that contention” (quoting
United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 633 (1953))).   The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit recently resolved a
strikingly similar issue of mootness with
respect to the same bankruptcy provision
under consideration in this appeal, section
521(2).  BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski
(In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 534 (2d
Cir. 2000).  In Sokolowski, the debtor
represented to the court that the relevant
loans were paid in full.  The creditor bank
acknowledged that the obligations were
paid in full but nevertheless argued that the
matter was capable of repetition yet
evading review.  Reply Br. at 6,
Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532 (2d Cir. 2000)
(Nos. 99-5048, 99-5054).2  Notwithstanding
this representation, the court held that
“Sokolowski ha[d] failed to proffer
competent evidence to support her claim
that this particular appeal ha[d] been
rendered moot.  Specifically, she ha[d] not
pointed to any evidence in the record of
her satisfaction of the BankBoston loan or
of her disposal of the vehicle in question.”
Sokolowski, 205 F.3d at 534.  Here, there
is a similar absence of any evidence
demonstrating mootness.  Counsel for the
Prices, like Sokolowski, stated her belief
that the Prices’ loans were paid in full,
offering no evidence whatsoever to
support that assertion.  Moreover, while
the creditor in Sokolowski acknowledged
full payment, in this case the Credit
Union’s response made no mention at all
of whether the obligations had been paid,
whether it relinquished its right to
enforcement, or whether it retained its
right to damages arising out of the order
on appeal requiring that the debtors must
redeem or reaffirm.  We have no assertion
by the Credit Union that the liens are fully
satisfied, no evidence that would compel a
f i n d in g  o f  m o o t n e s s ,  a n d  n o
easily conclude that the Credit Union can
reasonably expect to encounter other
borrowers that will file for personal
bankruptcy. 
    2While, as the dissent notes, this fact
was not specifically mentioned in the
Sokolowski opinion, it is clear that the
r e c o r d  c o n t a i n s  t h e  c r e d i t o r ’ s
acknowledgement that the loan had been
paid in full.
5acknowledgment that it has no claim
against the Prices.  Because the present
controversy is justiciable, we conclude that
it is proper to address the merits of the
Prices’ appeal. 
Accordingly, we have jurisdiction
over the District Court’s order under 28
U.S.C. § 158(d) and exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v.
R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 346
(3d Cir. 2001). 
III.
The Bankruptcy Code requires
debtors to file a “statement of intention”
with the bankruptcy court indicating
whether the debtor intends to retain or
surrender personal property subject to a
security interest.  11 U.S.C. § 521(2).
Section 521 provides, in relevant part, that:
The debtor shall–
(1) file a list of creditors,
and unless the court orders
otherwise, a schedule of
assets and liabilities, a
schedule of current income
and current expenditures,
and a statement of the
debtor's financial affairs;
(2) if an individual debtor's
schedule of assets and
liabilities includes consumer
debts which are secured by
property of the estate--
(A) within thirty days after the date of the
filing of a petition under chapter 7 of this
title or on or before the date of the meeting
of creditors, whichever is earlier, or within
such additional time as the court, for
cause, within such period fixes, the debtor
shall file with the clerk a statement of his
intention with respect to the retention or
surrender of such property and, if
applicable, specifying that such property is
claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends
to redeem such property, or that the debtor
intends to reaffirm debts secured by such
property;
(B) within forty-five days
after the filing of a notice of
intent under this section, or
within such additional time
as the court, for cause,
within such forty-five day
period fixes, the debtor shall
perform his intention with
respect to such property, as
specified by subparagraph
(A) of this paragraph; and
(C) nothing in subparagraphs
(A) and (B) of this paragraph
shall alter the debtor's or the
trustee's rights with regard
to such property under this
title.
11 U.S.C. § 521(1), (2) (emphasis added).
The meaning of section 521(2) has
been contested since its insertion into the
Bankruptcy Code in 1984.  It is clear that
debtors must inform the bankruptcy court
whether they intend to retain or surrender
collateral.  Of these two general options,
6surrender is straightforward.  The options
available in order to retain property,
however, are complicated by the phrase “if
applicable, specifying that such property is
claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends
to redeem such property, or that the debtor
intends to reaffirm debts secured by such
property.”  11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A).
Without a doubt, a debtor intent on
retaining collateral has at least these three
specified options, and may redeem the
property, reaffirm the underlying debt, or
claim the property as exempt under section
522(b).  Redemption permits a debtor,
subject to court approval, to keep secured
property by paying the creditor, ordinarily
in lump-sum, either the fair market value
or the “allowed secured claim.”  11 U.S.C.
§ 722.  Reaffirmation, on the other hand, is
retention effected through the negotiation
of a new loan agreement that would then
survive any eventual discharge from
bankruptcy.  Finally, property can be
exempted pursuant to section 522(b).3  The
thorny question which we decide today is
whether these three options are exclusive,
or whether section 521(2) contemplates
additional choices, including the one
asserted by the Prices, namely the ability to
retain personal property by remaining
current on the payments under a loan
agreement.  
A.
As noted at the outset, opinions of
the courts of appeals abound on this
question, with the courts being evenly
divided.  Both the Bankruptcy Court and
the District Court aligned themselves with
the Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth,
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, and
concluded that the “plain language” of
section 521 allowed only three options for
retaining property, i.e., redemption,
reaffirmation, and exemption.  See Bank
of Boston v. Burr (In re Burr), 160 F.3d
843, 847 (1st Cir. 1998); Johnson v. Sun
Fin. Co. (In re Johnson), 89 F.3d 249, 252
(5th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit
Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1516
(11th Cir. 1993); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d
1383, 1387 (7 th Cir. 1990).  In so doing,
the Bankruptcy Court and the District
Court rejected the views expressed by the
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that section
521(2) does not set out an exhaustive list
of options for retention, and permits
debtors to retain property while keeping
payments current.  See McClellan Fed.
Credit Union v. Parker (In re Parker), 139
F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998); Capital
Communs. Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow
(In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43, 53 (2d Cir.
1997); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345, 348
(4th Cir. 1992); Lowry Fed. Credit Union
v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir.
    3Property may be “exempted” under
section 522 if it fits within the class and
amount specified therein.  11 U.S.C.
§ 522.  Up to $2,400 in value in motor
vehicles can be exempted, as can interests
in household items up to $8,000 in
aggregate value, and certain liens can be
avoided to enable the debtor to have the
benefit of the exemption.  Id. § 522(d).
71989).
Not only have the appellate courts
been divided as to the result, but their
statutory interpretations and methods of
construction have differed as well.
Several courts have found the meaning of
section 521(2)(A)’s “if applicable”
language to be perfectly clear.  Yet like
beauty, clarity is often in the eye of the
beholder.  And notwithstanding their
perception of a plain meaning, these courts
have arrived at polar opposite results:  as
plainly limiting a debtor’s ability to retain
collateral to the three options enumerated
in the provision—exemption, redemption,
or reaffirmation—versus plainly leaving
open other unmentioned options, including
the ability to retain collateral by
maintaining current payments with a
creditor.  Compare, e.g., Burr, 160 F.3d at
843 with Parker, 139 F.3d at 668.  Yet
another court of appeals has held, in
contradistinction to the courts employing a
plain meaning analysis, that section 521(2)
is ambiguous and requiring consideration
of legislative history and policy for
clarification of congressional intent.  See
Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 43.
Given the range of views among the
courts of appeals, not to mention the
opinions of the several able district and
bankruptcy courts that have confronted
this issue, it is beyond question that section
521(2) poses tough interpretive challenges.
See, e.g., Ramirez v. GMAC (In re
Ramirez), 280 B.R. 252 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v.
DeJournette, 222 B.R. 86 (W.D. Va.
1998); Capital Communications Fed.
Credit Union v. Boodrow, 197 B.R. 409
(N.D.N.Y. 1996); Home Owners Funding
Corp. v. Belanger, 128 B.R. 142 (E.D.N.C.
1990).  But precisely this difficulty, and
the reticulated nature of the Bankruptcy
Code more generally, necessitates careful
attention to our method of statutory
construction.  In this vein, we respectfully
disagree with the interpretive approaches
taken by our fellow courts of appeals, for
we find that none are thoroughly consistent
with the mode of analysis followed by the
Supreme Court when it interprets the
Bankruptcy Code.  While noting the
difficulty of discerning such meaning, see
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 435
(1992) (“I have the greatest sympathy for
the Courts of Appeals who must predict
which manner of statutory construction we
shall use for the next Bankruptcy Code
case”) (Scalia, J., dissenting), the Supreme
Court has followed certain ground rules,
which guide our construction of section
521(2) and lead us to the result we
announce today.  
B.
We are to begin with the text of a
provision and, if its meaning is clear, end
there.  Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000) (“Congress ‘says in a statute what
it means and means in a statute what it
says there.’” (quoting Connecticut Nat’l
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254
(1992)).  This truism of statutory
construction may settle the matter in the
run of the mill case, but when the plain
8meaning of a provision is not self-evident,
this prescription is merely a starting point.
Given the division among the courts, such
is the case here.  But just because a
particular provision may be, by itself,
susceptible to differing constructions does
not mean that the provision is therefore
ambiguous.  “The plainness or ambiguity
of statutory language is determined by
reference to the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is
used, and the broader context of the statute
as a whole.”  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).  Statutory
context can suggest the natural reading of
a provision that in isolation might yield
contestable interpretations.  Specifically, in
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to
declare its provisions ambiguous,
preferring instead to take a broader,
contextual view, and urging courts to “not
be guided by a single sentence or member
of a sentence, but look to the provisions of
the whole law, and to its object and
policy.”  Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36,
43 (1986); see also Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp.,
ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330
F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(hereinafter Cybergenics) (“As the
Supreme Court has often noted,
‘[s]tatutory construction [] is a holistic
endeavor,’ and this is especially true of the
Bankruptcy Code.” (quoting United Sav.
Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988))).4
Thus, ambiguity does not arise
merely because a particular provision can,
in isolation, be read in several ways or
because a Code provision contains an
obvious scrivener’s error.  Lamie v. United
States Trustee, 124 S. Ct. 1023 (2004).
Nor does it arise if the ostensible plain
meaning renders another provision of the
Code superfluous.  Id. at 1031.  Rather, a
provision is ambiguous when, despite a
studied examination of the statutory
context, the natural reading of a provision
remains elusive.  In such situations of
unclarity, “[w]here the mind labours to
discover the design of the legislature, it
seizes every thing from which aid can be
derived,” United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.),
including pre-Code practice, policy, and
legislative history.
Yet policy, pre-Code practice, and
such other tools of construction are to be
relied upon only when, ultimately, the
meaning of a provision is not plain.
When, however, we can arrive at a natural
reading of a Code provision, informed not
    4In Cybergenics, for example, this Court
analyzed the meaning of a Bankruptcy
Code provision with reference to several
contextual features including related
provisions, the role of creditors in chapter
11 bankruptcy proceedings, and the
equitable powers of bankruptcy courts to
achieve the goals of the Code.
Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 559–69.
9only by the language of the provision itself
but also by its context, the burden to
persuade us to adopt a different reading is
“exceptionally heavy.”  Hartford
Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 9 (quoting
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 760
(1992)).  In Hartford Underwriters, the
Supreme Court faced the question whether
section 506(c) of the Code, which
specified that a “trustee may” recover
certain costs from property securing a
claim, authorized parties other than the
trustee to seek recovery.  Petitioner argued
that the mention of only “trustee” did not
foreclose the possibility that other parties
may also invoke section 506(c).  While
conceding that this expansive reading was
possible, the Court found that the more
“natural reading” was that the section
limited the availability to recover to
trustees alone.  The Court noted that
“[s]everal contextual features” supported
its conclusion, including an examination of
other related provisions in the Code.  Id. at
6.  Having settled on what was the most
plausible reading in light of the statutory
context, the Court dismissed petitioner’s
arguments concerning pre-Code practice
and policy considerations.  The Court
found that the language of section 506(c)
left “no room for clarification by pre-Code
practice.”  Id. at 11.  The Court further
concluded that its “natural reading of the
text” could not be overcome by an
alternative interpretation’s superior policy
consequences.  Id. at 13.  We approach
section 521(2) guided by the above
principles of construction.
C.
We begin with the pertinent text of
section 521(2)(A).  Congress has
mandated that  a debtor must file a
statement of intention “with respect to the
retention or surrender of such property
and, if applicable, specifying that such
property is claimed as exempt, that the
debtor intends to redeem such property, or
that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts
secured by such property.”  11 U.S.C.
§ 521(2)(A) (emphasis added).  The
trouble lies with the phrase “if applicable.”
Do those words merely indicate that the
three options—exemption, redemption,
and reaffirmation—are relevant when a
debtor intends to retain and not applicable
when a debtor chooses to surrender the
collateral?  If so, section 521(2)(A) sets
out an exhaustive set of retention options.
Or does “if applicable” mean “if” the
debtor wishes to choose any of the three
options that follow on its heels, i.e., when
redemption, reaffirmation, and exemption
“apply,” that intention must be specifically
stated?  If the latter construction is correct,
then section 521(2)(A) leaves available
other methods of retention, such as by
keeping the loan current.
The Courts of Appeals for the First,
Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
concluded that the plain meaning of
section 521(2)(A) limits a debtor to
specifying one of the three options
enumerated in the provision if retention is
“applicable.”   The First Circuit, for
instance, has reasoned that “it is perfectly
10
conventional usage, and perfectly good
English, for Congress to have phrased
§ 521(2)(A) in the way it did because it
intended chapter 7 debtors to elect
surrender or retention, and then, ‘if’
retention is ‘applicable,’ to specify which
of the following three retention options
they intend to employ.”  Burr, 160 F.3d at
848 (citing Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 59
(Shadur, J., dissenting)); see also Taylor, 3
F.3d at 1516 (finding that plain language
of section 521 provides a debtor with only
three option to retain collateral); Johnson,
89 F.3d at 252 (holding that the “clear
language” of section 521(2) limits a debtor
to the options enumerated in the
provision); Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1545 (“The
plain English of the section requires every
debtor [intent on retaining collateral] . . . .
to elect whether to redeem or reaffirm.”).5
By contrast to these courts, the
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits have found that the plain
language of section 521(2)(A) clearly
supports the opposite conclusion.  In
Parker, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found it plain that section
521(2)(A) did not limit debtors to the three
options set forth in the statute, i.e.,
redemption, reaffirmation, and exemption.
139 F.3d at 673.  The court held that the
provision only mandated the filing of a
statement of intention.  “Then, ‘if
applicable,’ —that is, if the debtor plans to
choose any of the three options listed later
in the statute . . . the debtor must so
specify in the statement of intention.”  Id.
The court concluded that other retention
options, including retaining property while
keeping a loan current, were unaffected by
section 521(2)(A).  Having found the
meaning of section 521(2)(A) to be plain
on its face, the court found no reason to
wade into legislative history or policy.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has held that if Congress
had intended to limit a debtor to the three
options in section 521(2), it could have
said so.  See Belanger, 962 F.2d at 345.
Section 521(2)(A) “would have simply
provided: ‘and specifying that such
property is claimed as exempt, that the
debtor intends to redeem such, or that the
debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by
such property.’”  Id. at 348.  Moreover, the
leading bankruptcy treatise is in accord
with this reading of section 521(2):
“Nothing in section 521(2) requires the
debtor to choose redemption, reaffirmation
or surrender of the property to the
exclusion of all other alternatives.  Section
521(2) merely requires a statement of
whether the debtor intends to choose any
of those options, if applicable.” 5 Collier
    5Notwithstanding this restrictive reading
of section 521(2)(A), the Tenth Circuit in
Lowry held that bankruptcy courts had the
discretion to permit a debtor to choose
other retention options.  The court’s
reasoning emphasized the absence of any
express means to enforce section 521(2).
Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1547 (“[A]lthough we
regard as mandatory the provisions of
[section 521(2)], we do not believe those
p rov i s ions  make  redempt ion  o r
reaffirmation the exclusive means by
which a bankruptcy court can allow a
debtor to retain secured property.”). 
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on Bankruptcy ¶ 521.10[2] (15th rev. ed.
2004) (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).  
Thus, an isolated reading of the “if
applicable” phrase has led to diametrically
opposed results.  “If applicable” may be
fairly read to limit a debtor’s retention
options to redemption, reaffirmation, and
exemption but it may also be fairly read to
leave open the possibility of other options.
Nothing in the language of section
521(2)(A) suggests one reading over
another, which in part explains the
contrasting judicial interpretations.  In
light of this division of opinion, we
conclude that section 521(2)(A)’s
command reasonably admits of two
readings.  But such equivocality is not
enough to conclude that the provision is
ambiguous.  Proper statutory construction
requires us to situate section 521(2)(A) in
the context of the Code.  “A provision that
may seem ambiguous in isolation is often
clarified by the remainder of the statutory
scheme—because the same terminology is
used elsewhere in a context that makes its
meaning clear, or because only one of the
permissible meanings produces a
substantive effect that is compatible with
the rest of the law.”  Timbers of Inwood,
484 U.S. at 371 (citation omitted).  We
therefore turn to other provisions, first
subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section
521(2), then to the Code in general, to see
if they help guide our reading of (A).
D.
Section 521(2)(B) requires a debtor
to “perform his intention with respect to
such property, as  spec i f ied  by
subparagraph (A)” within forty-five days.
This time-limit has been cited by appellees
and several of our fellow courts of appeals
as strong support for reading section
521(2)(A) as to only permit the three
enumerated options for retention.  These
courts have reasoned that the regular
payments to a lender cannot be
“performed” within forty-five days after
the filing of a notice of intent.  11 U.S.C.
§ 521(2)(B); Burr, 160 F.3d at 847 (citing
Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 59 (Shadur, J.,
dissenting)).  But we do not view
subparagraph (B) as necessarily helpful,
one way or the other, in our interpretation
of (A).
Section 521(2)(B) should not be
read as mandating that debtors must
entirely consummate their stated intention
within forty-five days.  See 5 Collier on
Bankruptcy ¶ 521.10[3] (15th rev. ed.
2004).  Several illustrations make this
clear.  While surrender could be made by
a debtor, a creditor may decline to accept
surrendered collateral.  Debtors and
creditors may not agree on the terms of a
reaffirmation agreement.  And even if
negotiation yields an agreement, a court
may nevertheless decline to approve it if,
for instance, it concludes that a debtor,
unrepresented by counsel, negotiated an
agreement that would not be in that
debtor’s best interests.  See 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(c)(6)(A)(ii).  Even with court
approval, the Code permits debtors to
rescind a reaffirmation agreement any time
prior to discharge or within sixty days of
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filing of the agreement with the court.
Moreover, a creditor’s challenge to a claim
for exemption may require more than
forty-five days.  Thus, section 521(2)(B)
cannot really mean that a debtor must fully
accomplish the option set out in the
statement of intention within this time
frame.  Read reasonably, section 521(2)(B)
requires debtors to take steps to act on an
intention to either retain or surrender.
Indeed, the authoritative Collier on
Bankruptcy describes the provision as a
“guideline signaling a trustee as to when
he or she should take action to move a
chapter 7 case to its conclusion by
ensuring that the debtor takes those steps
remaining to be taken.”  Id.  And, steps
toward retention with ongoing payments
can surely be taken in the required time
frame.  We, therefore, do not read section
521(2)(B) as necessarily excluding the
reading the Prices urge.  They did perform
their intention to retain within 45 days by
keeping their payments current in that
period.  We next turn to subparagraph (C)
of section 521(2).
E.
Section 521(2)(C) provides that
“nothing in the subparagraphs (A) and (B)
of this paragraph shall alter the debtor’s or
the trustee’s rights with regard to such
property under this title.”  We view this
subparagraph to be of enormous aid in our
reading of section 521(2)(A).  Here,
Congress has directed that courts afford
debtors the rights provided elsewhere in
the Code, specifically telling us not to read
section 521(A) or (B) as impinging on the
substantive rights guaranteed by other
provisions.  And, our examination of the
substantive rights provided elsewhere in
the Code guides us to conclude that
although unstated in section 521(2),
debtors do have the option to retain
property while staying current on loan
payments.  In other words, the Code
anticipates and affords the retention option
that the Prices have selected. 
This is because, when viewed as a
whole, the Bankruptcy Code allows
debtors to retain collateral, and keep
current on their loans, so long as that
collateral is adequately protected.  This
choice is not a “fourth option,” fashioned
as a novel exception to the Code; it is the
norm of chapter 7 bankruptcy law.  See
Burr, 160 F.3d at 847 (characterizing
option to retain and keep current as an
“unstated fourth option”).  Upon the filing
of a chapter 7 proceeding, all of the
property of the debtor becomes property of
the estate, and the trustee takes over that
property and administers it.  At the
moment the petition is filed, all secured
creditors are held at bay by virtue of the
provisions of the automatic stay.  11
U.S.C. § 362(a).  The automatic stay does
not, however, confer to a debtor unfettered
rights over collateral; a creditor’s interest
in its collateral remains preserved.  A
secured creditor retains the right to
“adequate protection” of its collateral,
which means it is entitled to have the value
of its collateral maintained at all times, and
it can obtain relief from the automatic stay
and take back its collateral at any time if
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that interest is not adequately protected or
for other “cause.”  See 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d).6  A persistent failure to make
monthly payments under loan documents
can constitute cause for granting relief
from the automatic stay.  See, e.g., In re
James River Assoc., 148 B.R. 790, 797
(E.D. Va. 1992); In re Kerns, 111 B.R.
777, 789-90 (S.D. Ind. 1990); In re
Klepper, 69 B.R. 98, 100 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1987).  If the value of collateral is
threatened, creditors may seek adequate
protection and relief from the automatic
stay, giving the permission to foreclose on
the property.  However, as long as the
creditor is adequately protected, i.e., the
debtor is not harming the collateral and its
value is being maintained (ideally, through
the making of regular payments), the
substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, and the notice provisions of section
521(2), do not give the secured creditor a
right to take any action whatsoever.  See
Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1546 (“Congress
provided neither a penalty for a debtor’s
failure to comply with § 521(2) nor a
specific remedy for a creditor as a
consequence of such a failure.” (footnote
omitted)).  Thus, if permitted to keep their
cars and honor their agreements with their
creditors, the Prices would be availing
themselves of rights guaranteed by the
Code.
The rest of the Code sets out a
period of time during which it is
anticipated the debtor will retain property.
Generally applicable provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code permit the trustee to
move to avoid liens on property, and
permit the debtor to convert the chapter 7
proceeding to a chapter 13 proceeding.
Also, the trustee is empowered to sell
property of the estate pursuant to
section 363, and the specific provisions of
chapter 7 provide that the trustee is
obligated to collect and reduce to money
the property of the estate and to be
accountable for all such property.  11
U.S.C. § 704(1)(2).
At the close of a chapter 7
proceeding, but before a final distribution
of property of the estate, the trustee is to
dispose of any property in which an entity
other than the estate has an interest, such
as a lien, and that has not been otherwise
disposed of.  See id. § 725.  In addition,
under section 554, the trustee may
a b a n d o n  p r o p e r t y  th a t  i s  o f
“inconsequential value and benefit to the
estate,” which would include property in
which the estate has little interest by virtue
of the amount of a lien held by a secured
    6Section 362(d) provides in part that: 
On request of a party in
interest and after notice and
a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay
provided under subsection
(a) of this section, such as
by terminating, annulling,
modifying, or conditioning
such stay—
(1) for cause, including the
lack of adequate protection
of an interest in property of
such party in interest.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
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creditor.  Id. at § 554.  Routinely, property
that the debtor desires to keep, the value of
which is less than the lien securing it, is
abandoned to the debtor.  And, under
section 727, the debtor is to receive a
discharge from all his debts, thus giving
the debtor a “fresh start.”  Id. § 727.  Thus,
we see that several options for dealing
with property are provided for elsewhere
in the Code and are not listed in
section 521.  These provisions lose their
meaning if the choices available in the first
forty-five days are limited by section
521(2)(A).
 The existence of these other
substantive rights leads us to the
conclusion that section 521(2), when
viewed in the context of the entire
Bankruptcy Code, is not intended to
deprive the Prices of broad retention
options.
F.
We also believe that viewing
section 521(2) as serving a procedural,
rather than substantive, function in the
Bankruptcy Code makes sense.  The
provision sets forth a debtor’s obligations
in all bankruptcy proceedings.7  For
instance, subsection (1) requires the filing
of a list of creditors; subsection (3),
cooperation with the trustee; subsection
(5), appearing at a hearing; and, subsection
(2), notice to the creditor in certain
circumstances.
    7 Viewing section 521 as  a notice
provision also makes sense when one
considers the ramifications of not giving
notice.  The leading bankruptcy treatise
explains that, “even if the debtor fails to
indicate an intent to redeem or exempt
property, that failure does not preclude
either action.  The statement of intention
may be amended, and the statute makes
clear that nothing in section 521(2) may
alter the debtor's rights, such as the rights
to exempt or redeem property.  Even if the
debtor fails to indicate an intent to redeem
or exempt property, that failure does not
preclude either action.”  5 Collier on
Bankruptcy ¶ 521.10[2] (footnotes
omitted).  Further, Collier notes that
“because the statute is intended to affect
only procedure, and not substantive rights
of the debtor, the debtor may still decide
not to follow through on the stated
intention, and choose, for example, not to
redeem or reaffirm even though an
intention to do so was originally stated.”
Id. ¶ 521.10[4] (footnote omitted).  If
section 521 is viewed, however, as
limiting the debtor’s options, does that not
necessarily mean that the debtor must
follow through on one of these three
options (presumably, within 45 days) and
perhaps suffer loss of the property in a
motion for relief from the stay – based on
cause – if he fails to do so?  It is difficult
to reconcile this thinking with the specific
provision that this section is not intended
to affect substantive rights.  Not
surprisingly, the opinions that proceed
along these lines have not confronted this
conundrum. 
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While several actions taken by
debtors necessitate notice, others do not.
The notice required in section 521(2) has
pragmatic implications.  An intention to
redeem secured property presupposes a
dialogue with the creditor, as does
negotiating the reaffirmation of an
underlying debt.  Further, creditors and
trustees have the opportunity to object to a
debtor’s claims that certain property is
statutorily exempt from distribution to
creditors.  See Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b);
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638,
639 (1992).  Consequently, a debtor’s
intention to redeem, reaffirm, or claim an
exemption is valuable information for a
secured creditor to learn at the beginning
of a chapter 7 proceeding, when a
lienholder is deciding whether to contest a
bankruptcy, including relief from the
automatic stay.  In contrast to these modes
of retention, electing to keep collateral by
remaining current on one’s loan
obligation—essentially affording the
protection required by the Code—does not
require specific creditor action.  If the
debtor does not default, “the secured
creditor has all the information necessary
to make a decision regarding the collateral.
Indeed, the secured creditor has little to do
under such circumstances except wait for
the expiration of the automatic stay.” Scott
B. Ehrlich, The Fourth Option of Section
521(2)(A)—Reaffirmation Agreements
and the Chapter 7 Debtor, 53 Mercer L.
Rev. 613, 656 (2002).  Sensibly, section
521(2)(A)’s notice requirements do not
implicate a debtor’s intention to retain
collateral by remaining current because the
option does not require creditors to take
any action other than continuing to receive
the bargained for amounts due.
Accordingly, we read the statutory
language of section 521 on its own and in
the context of the Code, as setting forth a
notice provision that does not limit a
debtor’s substantive retention options to
the three stated therein.
G.
Because our view that section
521(2)(A) does not bar nondefaulting
debtors from retaining collateral is based
on the plain language of the statute, the
burden to persuade us to adopt a different
reading is “exceptionally heavy.”  Hartford
Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 9.  We next
consider whether any extratextual
indicators, such as legislative history and
policy, would cause us to depart from our
conclusion. 
There is not a hint in the legislative
history that Congress intended to prevent
the Prices from retaining collateral as the
Prices have done.  Such a significant
alteration in the substantive rights of
debtors is not only doubtful in light of the
plain language of the provision, but would
have, we believe, occasioned some
mention in the pages of the Congressional
Record.  See Timbers of Inwood, 484 U.S.
at 380 (holding that “it is most improbable
that [a significant change to bankruptcy
procedure] would have been made without
even any mention in the legislative
history.”).  To the contrary, what little
legislative history there is underscores the
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correctness of our reading of section
521(2).8
Section 521(2) was inserted into the
Bankruptcy Code by the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333-
392 (1984).  But Congress deliberated over
its basic form as early as 1981, when the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts
heard testimony concerning the operation
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.  At
these hearings, a coalition of bankers,
credit unions, finance companies, oil
companies, and retailers introduced a
proposal to create a notice provision that
culminated in the enactment of section
521(2).9  These various creditors explained
that because chapter 7 bankruptcies took
place behind the veil of the automatic stay,
secured creditors possessed virtually no
information about their collateral.
Creditors who initiated proceedings to lift
the stay often learned that the debtors were
intending to surrender the collateral
without a contest all along.  The coalition
of creditors recommended a notice
provision in the Code to remedy this
communication failure.
After extensive debate, earlier
versions of 521 were reported out of the
Senate Judiciary Committee in both 1982
and 1983.  Perhaps the attention this issue
received from Congress from 1981
through 1983 explains the paucity of
legislative history surrounding section
521(2)’s ultimate enactment in 1984, when
the bill was passed without extensive
debate or published committee reports.
Indeed, the only shred of legislative history
comes in the form of an exchange on the
floor of the House of Representatives.  The
colloquy, between Representative Synar
and Representative Rodino, who was then
chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, is illuminating.  When
Representative Synar asked for an
explanation of debtors’ rights under
section 521(2)(C), Representative Rodino
replied that “this section is designed to
make it clear that the newly imposed duty
on the debtor to act promptly with regard
to property which is security for a
creditor’s claim does not affect the
substantive provisions of the code which
may grant the trustee or debtor rights with
regard to such property.”  130 Cong. Rec.
6204 (1984).  These comments underscore
    8See Ehrlich, supra, at 630 (observing
that “detailed” committee reports for
earlier, similarly drafted versions of
section 521(2) confirm that a debtor is not
limited to retention, reaffirmation, and
exemption).
    9The following discussion relies on
Bankruptcy Judge A. Thomas Small’s
comprehensive survey of section 521(2)’s
legislative history.  In re Belanger, 118
B.R. 368, 370–72 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990),
aff’d, 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1992); see
also Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 50 (relying
extensively on Judge Small’s discussion of
legislative history).  Judge Small’s analysis
is particularly compelling as he was one of
the witnesses who testified before the
Senate Subcommittee in 1981.  In re
Belanger, 118 B.R. at 371 n.4.
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our construction of the plain language of
section 521(2), confirming that section
521(2) concerned timing and notice and
was not intended to alter the substantive
rights of debtors or trustees.  Cf. Barnhart
v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457
n.15 (2002) (finding that floor statements
could not outweigh the clear and
unambiguous language of a statute).  
The legislative background of
section 521(2) indicates that Congress
enacted a notice provision in response to
creditors’ complaints that they had
insufficient information of a debtor’s
intentions.  There is no hint that the
provision was to serve another purpose or
to remedy other ills.  At the very least,
there is no indication that Congress
enacted section 521(2) to aid creditors
somehow menaced by debtors who
dutifully met their payment obligations.
Relatedly, a few of our sister courts
of appeals have argued that reading section
521(2)(A) to permit retention by staying
current would unfairly harm creditors in
two ways.  First, these courts have
reasoned that no rational debtor would
elect to redeem or reaffirm if the debtor
could exercise the option the Prices have
chosen.  See, e.g., Boodrow, 126 F.3d at
60 (Shadur, J., dissenting).  This
observation lacks persuasive force.  First
of all, it is not entirely clear that the
d r a c o n i a n  c h o i c e s  o f
redemption—ordinarily untenable for
chapter 7 debtors who are, by definition,
insolvent and unlikely to possess the funds
to buy their secured property outright—or
of the negotiation of an onerous
reaffirmation agreement—are to be
celebrated as preferred under the Code.  In
fact, the opposite is probably more to the
point, as we will discuss below.  But, even
if we were concerned as to the
disappearance of these options, the Credit
Union has simply not shown that this
result will follow.  As the Second Circuit
has recognized, a debtor with an option to
retain collateral while keeping current may
nevertheless have sound reasons to
reaffirm.  “[A] debtor may seek to reaffirm
in order to reestablish credit standing after
a bankruptcy discharge, or if the debtor
was not current on the loan when the
bankruptcy petition was filed, to obtain a
new agreement that would provide for the
right to cure the arrearage and avoid
default.”  Id. at 52.  In short, our decision
does not nullify redemption, reaffirmation,
and exemption as options.  Certainly the
Credit Union has not adduced any
evidence of this dramatic result.  Given
that over twenty states currently offer
debtors the retention option the Prices
have selected, it would not have been
difficult for the Credit Union to advert to
some evidence that the sky has fallen.
Tellingly, the Credit Union has not done
so.  While we do not doubt that retention
while staying current may be “the most
advantageous option” for some chapter 7
debtors, id. at 60 (Shadur, J., dissenting),
our construction of the plain language of
section 521(2) does not turn on the relative
desirability of the various rights provided
in the Code.
Second, some courts have been
troubled that allowing this option of
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retention somehow transforms secured
loans into nonrecourse debt without any
obligation to maintain collateral in good
condition.  See, e.g., Taylor, 3 F.3d at
1515–16 (“Allowing a debtor to retain
property without reaffirming or redeeming
gives the debtor not a ‘fresh start’ but a
‘head start.’”).  The purported evil of
discharging personal liability of a debtor is
not worthy of discussion, as a discharge is
the obvious and inevitable purpose of a
bankruptcy proceeding.  Further, it is not
clear to us, nor was it clear to the Second
Circuit, that creditors would be vulnerable
to financial injury from nondefaulting
debtors who pay their bills.  Boodrow, 126
F.3d at 52 (doubting whether creditors
“will necessarily or even probably suffer
financial injury when a debtor who is
current on a loan retains the collateral and
continues to make the payments required
under the loan agreement”).  
The loss of personal liability does
not necessarily mean that creditors are
vulnerable.  Indeed, a creditor’s financial
interest in the collateral is already
safeguarded by the adequate protection
provision of the Code.  As we have
discussed above, section 362(d)(1) would
allow creditors to seek to lift the automatic
stay if collateral is unprotected.  See 11
U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (permitting lifting of
automatic stay “for cause, including the
lack of adequate protection of an interest
in property of such party in interest”).  We
have explained that, “in determining
whether a secured creditor’s interest is
adequately protected, most courts engage
in an analysis of the property’s ‘equity
cushion’—the value of the property after
deducting the claim of the creditor seeking
relief from the automatic stay and all
senior claims.”  Nantucket Investors II v.
California Fed. Bank (In re Indian Palms
Assocs.), 61 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1995).
However, some courts have
questioned whether debtors possess an
incentive to maintain secured property
absent the threat of personal liability.  The
fear is overstated and entirely hypothetical.
It is just as reasonable to assume, given the
difficulty insolvent consumers may have in
obtaining future financing, that such
debtors would have ample incentive to
maintain their collateral, such as their
au tomobiles, in  good condi tion.
Additionally, it is commonplace for
creditors to insist on certain maintenance
requirements in the original loan
agreement.  “In fact default clauses which
permit the lender to declare a default in the
event that the creditor deems its security
interest insecure are specifically authorized
by the Uniform Commercial Code and may
be exercised by a secured lender if it has a
good faith belief that the prospect for
payment is impaired.”  Boodrow, 126 F.3d
at 52 (quoting In re Belanger, 118 B.R. at
372).  Accordingly, a creditor’s financial
interests are not necessarily compromised
by allowing debtors to retain collateral
while continuing to make their monthly
payments.
In the event that debtors such as the
Prices do default on their payments, we
agree with the Second Circuit’s conclusion
that a bankruptcy court may lift the
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automatic stay.  Id. at 52–53 (“Thus, a
debtor in default on a loan at the time of
the bankruptcy petition or whose behavior
indicates that he will not be able to
continue making scheduled payments
might well suffer a lifting of the stay.”).
So, in the absence of a default or an
insufficient equity cushion, a creditor is
not left high and dry.  And when a
creditor’s financial interests are not
impaired, the objections to our
interpretation of section 521(2)(A) resolve
into a general displeasure with the
elimination of personal liability.  But as we
have noted, the discharge of personal
liability is the essence of bankruptcy, the
prerequisite of a “fresh start.”  Without a
showing of grave financial injury to
creditors, we are not persuaded to depart
from the plain meaning of section
521(2)(A).
Lastly, but importantly, we believe
that our reading comports best with the
“fresh start” policy of the Code, because a
limited reading of section 521(2)(A) would
practically force debtors to reaffirm their
obligations.  Accord id. at 51 (“[c]onfining
an individual Chapter 7 debtor to the
choices of surrender, redemption or
reaffirmation can severely interfere with
providing the debtor a fresh start”).  This is
because redemption is in most cases
illusory for cash-strapped chapter 7
debtors, requiring payment in full, and
because the right to exempt property is
very limited.  Under the Credit Union’s
interpretation, reaffirmation would remain
as the only real retention option.
However, reaffirmation is viewed as a
classic evil in bankruptcy law, and is dealt
with in the Code so as not to exalt or
enable it, but, rather, so as to regulate and
scrutinize it, in light of its misuse.  See 11
U.S.C. § 524(c).  As one commentator has
observed, “[s]ection 524, as enacted in
1978 (and as modified since then in 1984
and 1986), allows reaffirmations when it
benefits debtors to do so, but requires
extensive procedural safeguards to prevent
ill advised reaffirmations.”  See Ehrlich,
supra, at 660.  We observe that debtors
would either have to accept possibly
onerous terms set by the creditor or
surrender the property.10  For instance, one
court of appeals has held that the Code
does not prohib it creditors from
    10The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reasoned that “strictly speaking,
debtors are never ‘forced’ to enter into
reaffirmation agreements; they can always
surrender the property and be discharged
of the underlying debt.”  Burr, 160 F.3d at
848.  While this interpretation may be
technically correct, it may be unrealistic.
For example, although redemption is a
retention option, the Burr court did “not
doubt that redemption is beyond the means
of most chapter 7 debtors, and that chapter
7 debtors wishing to retain consumer
goods on which they owe money will, as a
practical matter, be compelled to enter into
reaffirmation agreements with their
secured creditors.” Id.  But, also a practical
matter, many debtors may find it difficult
to surrender property that is vital to them,
such as an automobile used to commute to
one’s workplace. 
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conditioning reaffirmation on the debtor’s
agreement to reaffirm additional,
unsecured debts.  Jamo v. Katahdin Fed.
Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 392,
400 (1st Cir. 2002).  Thus, instead of
fulfilling both parties’ bargain, as is the
case if the debtor keeps up the contractual
payments, reaffirmation in fact nullifies an
existing bargain and permits creditors to
impose terms on debtors that compromise
the goals of a fresh start.  
To be clear, our construction of
section 521(2) is supported by, but does
not depend on, this policy discussion.  In
essence, bankruptcy law is bilateral,
replete with protections and policy
considerations favoring both debtors and
creditors.  We leave it for Congress to
balance these complex and conflicting
policy interests.  Our task of statutory
construction does not depend on
evaluating whether one side or another is
unfairly affected by the plain language of
the section.  See Lamie, 124 S. Ct. at 1032
(“Our unwillingness to soften the import
of Congress’ chosen words even if we
believe the words lead to a harsh outcome
is longstanding.”); Hartford Underwriters,
530 U.S. at 13 (“[W]e do not sit to assess
the relative merits of different approaches
to various bankruptcy problems.”).  It is
enough for our purposes that the plain
language of the provision, when viewed in
the context of its section and the Code as a
whole, leads to the result we embrace,
namely that section 521(2)(A) is a notice
provision which does not restrict debtors
from retaining their automobiles while
staying current on their loan payments. 
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the
District Court will be reversed. 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.  I do not
reach the court’s conclusion on this
perplexing bankruptcy issue because I am
convinced that we have no jurisdiction, as
the controversy is plainly moot.  That is
not a matter of choice but of constitutional
necessity.
It is axiomatic that “this court has a
‘special obligation’ to satisfy itself of its
own jurisdiction.” United States v. Touby,
909 F.2d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting
McNasby v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 832
F.2d 47, 49 (3d Cir. 1987)).  “[A] case will
be considered moot, and therefore
nonjusticiable as involving no case or
controversy, if the issues presented are no
longer live or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome.”  In re
Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).  
Our analysis of whether a case is
moot must begin with “the requirement of
Article III of the Constitution under which
the exercise of judicial power depends
upon the existence of a case or
controversy.”  North Carolina v. Rice, 404
U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (citation omitted).  
This case-or-controversy
r e q u i r e m e n t  s u b s i s t s
through all stages of federal
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judicial proceedings,
trial and appellate. . .
.  The parties must
continue to have a
personal stake in the
ou tcome of th e
lawsuit.  This means
that, throughout the
l i t i g a t i o n ,  t h e
plaintiff must have
suf fe red , or  be
threatened with, an
a c t u a l  i n j u r y
traceable to the
defendant and likely
to be redressed by a
favorable judicial
decision.
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)
(internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (emphasis added).  
We have previously stated that in
order for there to be a case or controversy,
there must be “(1) a legal controversy that
is real and not hypothetical, (2) a legal
controversy that affects an individual in a
concrete manner so as to provide the
f a c t u a l p r e d i c a te  f o r  r e a so n e d
adjudication, and (3) a legal controversy
with sufficiently adverse parties so as to
sharpen the issues for judicial resolution.”
In re Surrick, 338 F.3d at 229-30.  The
majority seeks to bring this case into the
exception to the mootness doctrine
recognized in Matter of Kulp Foundry,
Inc., 691 F.2d 1125, 1129 (3d Cir. 1982),
for issues that are capable of repetition yet
evading review.  I believe that exception is
inapplicable. 
The issue in the instant case is
whether section 521(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code requires the debtors to
surrender the automobiles for which they
were making loan payments, purchase
them in a lump sum payment, renegotiate
their respective loan agreements, or claim
a recognized exemption under the
Bankruptcy Code instead of continuing
their current payments and maintaining
possession.  Shortly after this appeal was
argued, counsel for the Debtors/Appellants
informed the court by letter that “[n]o
outstanding balance remains on either of
the two loans at this time” because one car
was involved in a collision for which the
insurance coverage was sufficient to pay
the remaining balance on the loan, and the
other car was paid for in full by the
Appellants.  Letter from Andrea G. Green,
Counsel for Appellants, to Clerk of Court,
at 1 (Mar. 25, 2004).  The creditor did not
respond by denying “that the other car was
paid for in full.”  Factually, there is no live
controversy--this court’s decision on the
issue will have no impact on either party.
In order to satisfy ourselves that we
continued to have jurisdiction, we directed
that the parties address whether the case is
now moot.  Surprisingly, the Debtors and
the Creditor both took the position that the
issue is capable of repetition yet evading
review.  The Creditor stated, “The
question commonly arises when a
consumer debtor with a five-year auto loan
files for bankruptcy relief . . . . Because of
the time required to prosecute an appeal to
this Court, the issue would most probably
become moot in such cases, assuming that
the debtor continues to make payments to
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the secured creditor, prior to resolution by
this Court.”  Letter from W.J Winterstein,
Jr., Counsel for Appellee, to Clerk of
Court, at 1 (Apr. 28, 2004) (emphasis
added).  Significantly, the Creditor did not
deny that there was nothing more owing in
this case.  However, it is understandable
why the Creditor would want this court to
decide the issue as other debtors may seek
the same option the Prices sought and the
Creditor resists.  Why the Prices took that
position is less understandable.  One
would have assumed that they would
prefer to have the case behind them, which
leads me to wonder whose interest is being
served by their counsel’s insistence that
the case is not moot.  
The exception to mootness on
which the majority relies does not apply
here.  
As the Supreme Court has stated:
The capable-of-repetition
doctrine applies only in
exceptional situations where
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t w o
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a r e
simultaneously present: (1)
the challenged action is in
its duration too short to be
fully litigated prior to
cessation or expiration, and
(2) there is a reasonable
expectation that the same
complaining party11 will be
subject to the same action
again.
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17 (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).  It is highly
unlikely that the Prices will again face the
same situation. 
The Supreme Court has stated there
must be an “exceptional situation” present
to “permit departure from the usual rule in
federal cases that an actual controversy
must exist at stages of appellate or
certiorari review, and not simply at the
date the action is initiated.”  DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319 (1974).  The
Credit Union’s bald assertion that “the
issue would most probably become moot
in such cases,” supra, is too speculative to
warrant characterization as an “exceptional
situation.”
The Supreme Court has stated,
“The burden of demonstrating mootness
‘is a heavy one.’” County of Los Angeles
v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (citing
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 632-33 (1953)).  This court, in
Princeton Community Phone Book, 582
F.2d 706, 710 (3d Cir. 1978), stated that
the “party arguing that a case is moot must
bear a heavy burden of demonstrating the
    11   It is not readily apparent which party
is the “complaining party” in a bankruptcy
proceeding.  The Prices filed for relief
under Chapter 7, and so initiated
proceedings in the federal court system.
To protect its interests, the Credit Union
filed the Motion to Compel that the
District Court granted and the Prices are
now appealing.  Even if the Credit Union
were deemed to be the complaining party,
its vague assertion of likelihood of
repetition cannot meet the “exceptional
situations” standard.
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facts underlying that contention.”  Id.  The
majority argues that these “letters from
counsel, containing vague assertions as to
the satisfaction of the Prices’ loans, [do
not] meet the heavy burden of establishing
mootness.”  Majority Op. at 4 (citing
Princeton).  This is not surprising as both
parties explicitly implore the court to
resolve the issue despite the lack of a
current controversy.
It may be an open issue as to which
party has the burden to show mootness.
The Supreme Court has stated:
We presume that federal
courts lack jurisdiction
“unless ‘ the  contra ry
appears affirmatively from
the record.’”  Bender v.
Williamsport Area School
Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546
(1986), quoting King Bridge
Co. v. Otoe County, 120
U.S. 225, 226 (1887).  “‘It is
the responsibility of the
complainant clearly to
allege facts demonstrating
that he is a proper party to
invoke judicial resolution of
the dispute and the exercise
of the court's remedial
powers.’” Bender, supra,
475 U.S. at 546 n.8, quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 517-518 (1975).
Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991).
In prior cases, the Court placed the
burden on the party claiming mootness
who sought to use that claim defensively
to preclude suit.  See W.T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. at 632-33; Davis, 440 U.S. at 631-32.
 In the Second Circuit case relied on by the
majority, In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532
(2d Cir. 2000), the debtor alone claimed
mootness.  The opinion does not indicate
that the appellant creditor bank conceded
there was no outstanding debt.12  It was
therefore reasonable to place the burden on
the debtor claiming mootness, as the bank
could have been left with no judicial
recourse to resolve that issue.   In the
instant case, both parties concede the fact
of actual mootness, and we therefore need
not decide which bears the burden. 
We cannot avoid the principle that
parties cannot stipulate as to whether a
matter is moot.  Allowing the parties to
bypass the mootness issue simply by filing
factually vague letter briefs because they
desire judicial resolution would be
tantamount to stipulating out of mootness.
The Supreme Court has stated,
The dissent’s startling
statement that our insistence
on plaintiffs with live claims
is purely a matter of form
    12  The majority Opinion states that in In
re Sokolowski, the creditor bank conceded
that the debtor’s obligations were paid in
full, but the Sokolowski opinion contains
no suggestion of this concession, nor is
there any indication that the court
considered or gave credence to any
concession.  One can reasonably assume
that the court decided the mootness issue
only on the factual deficiency of the
debtor’s proffer, as that is the only reason
the opinion provides.
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would read . . . Art.
I I I  out  o f  th e
Constitution.  The
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f
thoroughly prepared
attorneys to argue
both sides of a . . .
question . . . does not
dispense with the
requi rement tha t
there be a live
dispute between live
parties before we
d e c i d e  s u c h  a
question.  
[T]he fact that the
parties desire a decision on
the mer i t s  does  not
automatically entitle them to
receive such a decision.  It is
not at all unusual for all
parties in a case to desire an
adjudication on the merits
when the alternative is
additional litigation; but
their desires can be scarcely
thought to dictate the result
of our inquiry into whether
the merits  should be
reached.
Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 134
n.15 (1977) (internal quotation marks and
citations to dissent omitted).  It follows
that however learned Judge Rendell’s
opinion on a subject of some interest and
however much light it would spread, it is,
at most, an advisory opinion.  The Credit
Union has not argued that there is still
money due it and it can no longer do so at
this late date.  The Prices have only one
automobile now, and the debt for that has
been fully paid.  Accordingly, I would
dismiss this appeal as moot.
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